The Civilian Component

Since I read a book on the Marshall Plan, I’ve been dismayed that there was never an economic plan to rebuild for the Iraq War. I’ve recently been using it as an argument that Bush was never serious about the war and as an argument as to why the surge will not work. This requires a large civilian component, I realize. The military is not made for nation-building, but if we want a democracy, we have to nation-build. If you’ve been paying attention, you’ll find that this sounds familiar because I had a similar complaint after the State of the Union. I only wish I had the necessary historical knowledge all along.

In light of the importance of the civilian component for victory, I point you to this article in the New York Times: Military Wants More Civilians to Help in Iraq. This is really, really, really, really important, and I hope that I see it hammered in the blogosphere, but I doubt it. I’m going to quote liberally from the article.

As evidence of the importance of civilian reconstruction, military officers involved in the internal debate are citing a recent classified study, conducted by the Joint Warfare Analysis Center of the Defense Department, based in Dahlgren, Va., that suggests violence in Baghdad drops significantly when the quality of life improves for Iraqi citizens.

Relying on surveys and other data on those wounded and killed in the violence as compiled by the military, the study found that a 2 percent increase in job satisfaction among Iraqis in Baghdad correlated to a 30 percent decline in attacks on allied forces and a 17 percent decrease in civilian deaths from sectarian violence.

The study did not examine the security benefits of adding troops to Iraq or compare it to the nonmilitary portions of the new strategy, according to those who have been briefed on the classified document.

But its emphasis on the importance of reconstruction is being cited by senior military officers and Pentagon officials as more evidence that Congress and the government’s other civilian departments must devote more money and personnel to nonmilitary efforts at improving the economy, industry, agriculture, financial oversight of government spending and the rule of law.

People can talk about the lack of troops, but in my mind this is what lost us the war in the first place. We never took seriously the rebuilding of Iraq (or perhaps suspected that major corporations would magically rebuild). Even if we did what we did, when people don’t have jobs, they become criminals. In Iraq, the criminals pose as religious fanatics. Unless we take seriously this civilian build-up, I guarantee that if any violence is quelled, it will quickly crop up again. These are good statistics to back-up my prediction.

Here’s a quote on why we’re in this situation in the first place:

The mounting tensions between the Pentagon and other departments are in some ways the mirror image of those that roiled the government before the 2003 invasion. Then, State Department officials grumbled that the Pentagon was usurping its role in planning the postwar civilian occupation; today, the military is eager to see others step in.

Now I wish I had finished Fiasco. I will do it eventually. Anyway, from what I can glean here, it looks like it may be Rummy’s fault. This is a massive strategic failure. So, even if the neocons counter me when I’ve argued that there was no plan, I can still claim that these “plans” lacked sufficient cooperation from other departments. After all, I will stress once again that the military is not built for nation-building.

Members of the Joint Chiefs and commanders in Iraq have been delivering the same message recently to the president and defense secretary about the necessity for other parts of government to join the effort, according to administration and military officials.

Oh good, it’s not just me who thinks it’s important. I just wish it had been stressed all along.

The entire United States Foreign Service numbers only 6,000 people, about the size of a military brigade.

This doesn’t sound good.

The officials said the commanders had also been expressing broader frustrations, including that the additional $1 billion in new money for reconstruction requested by the president may not be sufficient.

This doesn’t sound good either.

So, my fellow conservatives, when you complain that Americans don’t have the backbone to win this war, maybe we should all be asking if we have the pocketbook to win the peace. People moan about how this war is so far away, and that’s why people don’t protest. Well, it does affect us. Right in the wallet.

Are you willing to put up the necessary money to win the reconstruction? Are the American people willing to put up this money?

If the answer is no, then the only other option is to support a withdrawal.

0 thoughts on “The Civilian Component

  1. Lloyd Nebres

    Excellent argument, and almost watertight. Almost.

    I submit that this had been taken into seriuos consideration shortly before the invasion—in fact by the State Department itself, and other special agencies tasked with postwar planning. But did the BCR nexus (Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld) take this into account? You know what the answer to that is.

    This is what’s infuriating about the whole Iraq enterprise. There WAS a component ready and willing to take on the hugely important task of rebuilding Iraq’s total infrastructure, but it was wilfully and dismissively shoved aside—utterly ignored—in favor of the primacy and sole focus on the military-political ‘solution.’ And we all know how THAT has turned out.

    But here’s the problem as I see it, Shawn. Even if there was/is a “Marshall Plan for Iraq” in place, I simply cannot see it succeeding… for simple structural and cultural reasons. What am I talking about? Well, “talking.” We do not have anywhere near the number of Arabic speakers/translators for such a huge project to be undertaken, let alone succeed. It’s a structural problem—the U.S.’, lack of Arabic speakers/specialists—that when you trace it, is at its roots a cultural problem: American cultural solipsism manifested in utter linguistic ignorance. Americans at large just aren’t interested in cultures other than their own, hence don’t *learn* other cultures, whether its their mores or their languages. You know as well as I do that, as far as being world citizens are concerned, Americans are total ignoramuses.

    But maybe I’m being unfair. We do have aspects of American culture that are now integrating Hispanic stuff. Maybe even Japanese and Chinese stuff. Maybe. (I would argue not, however.)

    But Arabic stuff? Fuggedaboutit. Not even close. Hence, a program of nation-building in Iraq would be structurally dysfunctional even before it starts. We can’t just jury-rig and put in place an entire nation’s physical, political and social infrastructure like artificial wall siding for a prefab house.

    Frankly, this issue is moot, alas. We do not have such a programme in place, and it’s a bit on the late side, what with the sectarian civil war spiraling into a nightmarish inferno. Even if we somehow magically procured a working plan, and even if the answer to your final question about money is a yes… would it be fair to ask tens of thousands of ordinary American civilians to risk their lives by helping build an Iraqi society in the midst of a maelstrom? It sounds brutally absurd, doesn’t it?

    Indeed it does, when we can’t even manage to fix and rebuild New Orleans, and they speak American there. ;p

  2. Lloyd Nebres

    p.s.

    Right after I posted the above comment, I went to Salon.com.

    Read this and weep: Mission deflated

    We can’t even manage to give soccer balls to Iraqi kids properly!

    And the metaphor of the gift of a deflated ball is utterly perfect, no?

  3. Lloyd Nebres

    p.p.s.

    In early 1992, James Fallows had been talking to the people who were thinking about putting together a post-war plan for Iraq. He summarizes his findings brilliantly, as usual, in an Atlantic Monthly piece: The Fifty-first State?.

    Just one simple quote, to bolster my argument above: “Wherever the occupying force finds its manpower, it will face the challenge of understanding politics and rivalries in a country whose language few Americans speak. … Inability to communicate could be disastrous.”

    Laying aside anything else, Shawn… it’s a simple AND complex structural problem: we can’t speak their language. How should we rebuild their country? By mimicry and hand gestures?

    I suppose we could try, yes, but it would take an entire new generation of teaching Arabic to bright young selfless Americans before we can even get going.

    I put my money on the vast majority of bright young Americans continuing to be selfish and self-absorbed. That’s as safe a bet as can be imagined.

    But don’t let that bleak view stop you. Change it! Please.

    /end cynical rant